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I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 2008, Fidel Castro stepped down from power as
Cuban leader, due to failing health, after forty-nine years in office. 1 In
* Dean and Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, International University of Sarajevo (IUS);
Member, Illinois State Bar; Founding Editor-in-Chief, IUS Law Journal; and Corresponding
Editor, International Legal Materials (ILM). S.J.D., Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
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a farewell address to delegates at the Seventh Congress of the
Communist Party of Cuba (“CPC”) in April of 2016, Castro expressed
his personal belief that the enduring “ideas of [ . . .] Cuban
communists” lent proof to the proposition that, with dedicated hard
work, the Cuban government “can produce the material and cultural
goods that human beings need.” 2 He advised the delegates to “fight
without truce to obtain” these goods for citizens. 3 Those material and
cultural goods citizens need for a good life that, as a matter of human
rights rather than privilege, 4 their leaders must fight tirelessly to
provide for them, form the focus of this Article.
School of Law—Indianapolis; Ph.D. in political science, Howard University; J.D., Temple
University Beasley School of Law; LL.M. (summa cum laude), IU Robert H. McKinney School
of Law—Indianapolis; M.A. in political science, University of North Texas; B.A. (magna cum
laude) in political science, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania. Dr Aka teaches Constitutional
Law, Administrative Law, and Labor Law at IUS, along with courses outside this core like
Bioethics, Information Technology Law, Insurance and Social Security Law, Legal Ethics,
Public International Law, and Tax Law. He is a highly-regarded legal scholar whose research
interest focuses on issues related to minority populations, including human rights. His recent
publications include Human Rights in Nigeria’s External Affairs: Building the Record of a
Moral Superpower (Lexington, 2017), which work won the Cecil B. Currey Prize for Best Book
on the Developing World for 2017 by the Association of Global South Studies.
1. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Fidel Castro Resigns as Cuba’s President, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/americas/20castro.html
[https://perma.cc/ZVV6-CEA8]; Castro Resigns Presidency of Cuba, After 49 Years, NPR (Feb.
19,
2008),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19157999
[https://perma.cc/M2JV-7VM2].
2 . Roy Carroll, Fidel Castro Bids Farewell to Cuba’s Communist Party Congress,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/19/fidel-castrofarewell-speech-cuba-communist-congress [https://perma.cc/96ST-SL7U]. The congress of the
party is the highest decision-making organ in both the government and the party. The first such
congress, attended by a record 3,116 delegates, the largest ever, was held in December of 1975.
See, e.g., Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba - PCC), GLOBAL SECURITY,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/communist-party.htm
[https://perma.cc/24K7-F7EK] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
3. Carroll, supra note 2.
4. See Difference Between Right and Privilege, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (July 14, 2012),
https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-right-and-vs-privilege/
[https://perma.cc/KN7P-V7E9] (explaining that “[p]rivileges are conditional and can be
withdrawn[,] while rights are inherent and cannot be withdrawn.”). For a description of the
distinction between these two doctrines in US constitutional history, see Dennis J. Mahoney
Kenneth L. Karst, Right-Privilege Distinction, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (2000), available at https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-and-maps/right-privilege-distinction
[https://perma.cc/6VW4-R6EN].
From the standpoint of human rights advocacy, several factors make a human rights approach
superior to one based on privilege. First, with human rights, the risk of derogation is minimized,
given that phrasing one’s work in human rights terms “takes you back to the primacy of equality
and dignity[,] no matter what the circumstance,” quoted in Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S.
Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 426 (2006). Second,
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On November 25, 2016, little over seven months later, Castro
died, aged ninety. 5 Reactions all over the world, reflecting on his life
and times, were mixed. Some remembered him positively for the access
to socioeconomic goods he created at home and abroad, as well as for
his commitment to equal treatment of peoples, evident in his support of
national independence, opposition to colonial rule, and opposition to
racism and xenophobia, to name these gestures. 6 Representative of
these positive tributes were separate statements from Bill Bonnar and
Jeremy Corbyn. Bonnar observed that “Castro’s entire political life was
given to the struggle for Cuban independence[,] and the struggle for
liberation and socialism all over the world.” 7 Corbyn, then leader of the
Labor Party in the United Kingdom, eulogized Castro as a “huge figure
of modern history, national independence[,] and 20th century
socialism.” 8 “For all his flaws,” which he left unspecified, Corbyn
gave Castro credit for many achievements, including building worldclass health and education systems, a record of international solidarity
abroad, and support for the decolonization struggle in Angola which
helped end apartheid in South Africa, ultimately making way for black
majority rule in the land. 9 In short, he said, the deceased Cuban leader
“will be remembered both as an internationalist and a champion of
social justice.” 10
Other sympathizers viewed Castro’s legacy negatively, for
example, by remembering him only as a dictator who suppressed
related to the first and reinforcing it, “[y]ou cannot reduce rights. You either have to hold the
line or increase them.” Id. at 431 (quoting Cathy Albisa of the Center for Economic and Social
Rights, a human rights group headquartered in Brooklyn, New York).
5. See, e.g., Fidel Castro, Cuba’s Leader of Revolution, Dies at 90, BBC (Nov. 26, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38114953
[https://perma.cc/SV5B-K2JY];
Raul Castro Announces Death of Fidel Castro, BBC (Nov. 26, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-38115171/raul-castro-announces-death-offidel-castro [https://perma.cc/74TA-G96H].
6. See infra notes 7-10 and corresponding text.
7. Bill Bonnar, Fidel Castro: A 90[-]Year Cuban Legacy, SCOTTISH SOCIALIST PARTY
(Nov.
27,
2016),
https://scottishsocialistparty.org/fidel-castro-90-year-cuban-legacy/
[https://perma.cc/74TA-G96H]. Bonnar was at the time the national secretary of the Scottish
Socialist Party.
8. Jamie Doward, Castro was “Champion of Social Justice” Despite Flaws, Says Corbyn,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/26/jeremy-corbynleft-uk-politics-fidel-castro [https://perma.cc/679Z-SPHJ].
9. Dan Bloom, Jeremy Corbyn Will Not Attend Fidel Castro’s Funeral, Labor Source
Confirms, MIRROR (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jeremy-corbynnot-attend-fidel-9353118 [https://perma.cc/AC5X-V4E2].
10. Doward, supra note 8.
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freedom of expression in Cuba. 11 One such evaluation came from
Donald J. Trump, then President-Elect of the United States who opined
that Castro was “a brutal dictator who oppressed his own people for
nearly six decades[,]” adding that his “legacy is one of firing squads,
theft, unimaginable suffering, poverty and the denial of fundamental
human rights.” 12
There were also tributes that combined these diametrically
opposite assessments. A tribute that typifies this category was a
statement by one Erika Guevara-Rose, Americas director of Amnesty
International who remembered Castro as “progressive but deeply
flawed.” 13 Guevara-Rose elaborated that Castro oversaw dramatic
improvements in access to human rights, such as healthcare and
housing, accompanied by an unprecedented drive to improve literacy
rates across the country. 14 However, despite these achievements in
areas of social policy, she went further, Castro’s long period in office
“was characterized by a ruthless suppression of freedom of
expression[,]” including arrest and harassment of dissidents for
speaking out against the government, which she assessed as “Fidel
Castro’s darkest legacy.” 15
Cuba has a population of approximately 11.5 million people, at
least ten percent of which is Black.16 The largest island in the West
Indies, it comprises the Island of Cuba (westernmost of the Greater
Antilles), the Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth), and 1,600 small

11. See infra note 15 and corresponding text.
12. Julian Borger, Trump and Obama Offer Divergent Responses to Death of Fidel Castro,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/26/fidel-castrodeath-obama-trump-response [https://perma.cc/A8BZ-NJCS]. See Javier Corrales, Fidel Was
Hell, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 26, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/26/cuba-fidelcastro-was-hell/ [https://perma.cc/6R7E-LB5N] (contending that Castro “was a radical bent on
transformational, alternative global development[,]” who paradoxically “left his country
conservative, impoverished, and isolated”).
13. Erika Guevara-Rose, Fidel Castro’s Human Rights Legacy: A Tale of Two Worlds,
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/fidelcastro-s-human-rights-legacy-a-tale-of-two-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/8MR4-DFHN].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16 . Sandra A. Levinson & Franklin W. Knight, Cuba, BRITANNICA ONLINE
ENCYCLOPEDIA (section under “People”), https://www.britannica.com/print/article/145542
[https://perma.cc/9RDB-Q6CS]. The number is actually higher, given that about two-thirds of
Cubans have some African roots. Anita Snow, Fidel Castro Heads to Africa, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 29, 2001), http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm [https://perma.cc/XDQ98XFA].
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offshore islands. 17 Cuba is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the northeast, the Gulf of Mexico in the north-west, the Straits of Florida in the
north-central, the Cayman Trench in the south-east, and the Caribbean
Sea in the south-west. 18 Cuba lies about 90 miles south of Key West,
Florida in the United States. It also has an 18-mile land border in the
south-east where the US government maintains a naval base at
Guantánamo Bay that it leases from Cuba. 19
From the standpoint of governmental system, Cuba is a socialist
state founded on Marxist-Leninist doctrines, where the CPC retains a
monopolistic role in the government and society as an “organized
vanguard of the Cuban Nation.” 20 In the aftermath of his death,
Castro’s successors have pledged to maintain this political system, 21 at
a time many socialist states elsewhere have abandoned communism.22
Still on governmental arrangement, Cuba has a unitary system of
government—made up of a central government, fifteen provinces, and
one special municipality in Juventud Island—that derives its legitimacy
from a 1976 constitution as amended in 1992 and 2002. 23 For its legal
system, Cuba has a civil law tradition based on Spanish civil code. 24
Economically speaking, Cuba operates a centrally planned
economy matching its socialist government, but with a dose of market
17. Australian Gov’t Dep’t of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Cuba Country Brief, DFAT,
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/cuba/Pages/cuba-country-brief.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZY95-3J5C] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Australian Gov’t].
18 . Cuba, WORLD ATLAS (July 12, 2016), https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/
countrys/namerica/caribb/cu.htm [https://perma.cc/X5QV-AJLG].
19. Australian Gov’t, supra note 17.
20 . See Communist Party of Cuba, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-Cuba [https://perma.cc/T2DH-LHR3].
See also Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (under “History,” specifically “the Castro regime.”).
21. See Diego Oré & Sarah Marsh, Cuba’s Raul Castro Vows to Defend Brother’s Legacy
in Final Tribute, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-castroidUSKBN13S0SG [https://perma.cc/2KNB-TT7B] (stating that Raul Castro “pledged to defend
the socialist legacy of his brother[,] Fidel Castro”); Shakir Husain, Cuba Sticks to Castro’s
Foreign Policy under New President, DAILY SABAH (June 8, 2018),
https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/06/08/cuba-sticks-to-castros-foreign-policy-undernew-president [https://perma.cc/965P-CTV5] (referring to Miguel Diaz-Canel, first non-Castro
president since the revolution, who took over from Raul Castro in April of 2018).
22. See Socialist Countries 2019, WORLD POPULATION, http://worldpopulationreview.
com/countries/socialist-countries/ [https://perma.cc/8FDQ-DMLE] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019)
As of today, 12 states, including China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, describe themselves
as socialist states, while 23, including Angola and Mozambique, have abjured that title.
23. Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Government and Society”).
24. Australian Gov’t, supra note 17. For more details, see, e.g., Kelly Buchanan, FALQs:
Cuban
Legal
System,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
(Jan.
27,
2015),
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/01/falqs-cuban-legal-system/ [https://perma.cc/C2L5-BSVC].
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forces designed to minimize the hardship effect of longstanding US
embargoes on the country, 25 subsequently complicated by the
withdrawal of generous Soviet assistance of about US $5.6 billion per
annum. 26 Sugar exports remain among the mainstays of Cuba’s
economy, but as the share of this product in foreign exchange has
declined over the years from about seventy-five percent to below fifty
percent, services appear to pick up the slack, with tourism, education,
healthcare, and entertainment now accounting for about forty percent
of employment within the country. 27
Under Castro, Cuban foreign policy in Africa was marked by
energetic activities, particularly from about 1975 to 1991, that some
commentators dub “intervention.” 28 Since, as the Greek philosopher
Socrates advised long ago, an unexamined life is not worth living, 29
this Article assesses and sheds light on these acts of “intervention,”
focusing specifically on the social, economic, and cultural human
rights (or socioeconomic human rights) plank of that policy.
The academic literature tends to subsume Cuban investments in
socioeconomic human rights in Africa under Castro (where it covers
these rights at all) under its general program of military assistance in
service of international communism (or the international socialist
movement). 30 This Article takes a more disaggregating and
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra note 106 and corresponding text.
Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Economy”).
Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Economy”).
See, e.g., Allan S. R. Sumnall, Cuban Intervention in Africa, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LATIN
AM.
HISTORY
AND
CULTURE
(2008),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-andmaps/cuban-intervention-africa [https://perma.cc/8EVW-2BQV]; GEORGE EDWARD, THE
CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, 1965-1991 (2012). See also Wolf Grabendorff, Cuba’s
Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions, and Limitations, 22 J.
INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFFAIRS 3, 5 (1980) (pointing out that “[m]ost African states
view Cuban intervention in Africa as help in achieving independence through self-help, rather
than as a step toward the type of dependence which would result from a similar commitment by
the super-powers”).
29. See James M. Ambury, Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, https://www.iep.utm.edu/socrates/#SSH2biii [https://perma.cc/CZ6L-Z2ER].
30. See generally JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, TO MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION:
CUBA’S FOREIGN POLICY (1989). On the international communist movement, see, e.g., Stephen
A. Smith, Introduction: Towards a Global History of Communism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 1-36 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 2014). Specifically, for Latin
America, see Mike Gonzalez, Communism in Latin America, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 252-67 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 2014). For one of the few exceptions
to this general tendency, see Sergio Roca, Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa,
10 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS CUBA 55-90 (1980).
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complicated view. It portrays Castro’s contributions to socioeconomic
human rights in Africa, in its own right, unattached to its general
military assistance programs, as a function of three interrelated
variables: (1) Cuban national security, (2) service to the international
socialist movement, and (3) the synergistic interaction of these two
variables. Moving forward, it argues that Cuba under Castro deserves
recognition as a global Good Samaritan because of a broad view of
national security the country undertook by pursuing principled policies
abroad that consistently and systematically infused human rights in its
external policies, one of a rare example from the socialist world in a
literature dominated by attention to capitalist-oriented states. 31
This Article has six sections, including this introduction and a
conclusion. Part II defines socioeconomic human rights. Part III
provides a brief background history of Cuban-African relations. Part
IV lays out the measure of Cuban military and socioeconomic
assistance in Africa during the period of active engagement from 1975
to 1991 at the heart of this Article. Part V, the centerpiece of the work,
sets forth a multi-level explanation of Castro’s contributions to
socioeconomic human rights in Africa.
II. DEFINING SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS
To define socioeconomic human rights, it is appropriate to first
determine the broader concept of human rights. “Human rights” are
guarantees of freedom of various categories that, ideally, individuals
and groups everywhere have equally, free of invidious discrimination,
by virtue of the fact that they are human beings who need these rights
to live a life of dignity. 32 There are at least thirty-eight of these rights
distilled from the international bill of human rights 33 —all, in turn,
31. See infra Part 5.D.
32. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR] (pronouncing recognition of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as basis for “freedom, justice and peace
in the world”); id., art. 1 (stating that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights”).
33. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (Table 1.1) (4th ed. 2013).
Instruments of the international bill of human rights include the UDHR (1948), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the last two of which came into force in 1976. Some
commentators include the U.N. Charter (1945), the first instrument ever to use the language of
human rights, among the documents of the international bill of human rights. The UDHR sets
forth “common standards of achievement for all peoples and all nations” that the two human
rights covenants, as binding multilateral treaties, then elaborated.
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traceable to the four-freedom doctrine of then US President Franklin
D. Roosevelt: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear. 34
The international human rights instrument that, in our time,
popularized these rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948, 35 in the aftermath of a bloody global war hallmarked by denial
of every measure of basic rights, including the right to life, and of
access to food. 36 As then Human Rights Watch chief, Kenneth Roth,
poignantly stated in a commentary on this key human rights instrument,
persons “who live in countries that respect the Universal Declaration
in all its dimensions enjoy the freedom and means to live life to its
fullest[,]” in that, for example, “[t]hey are able to speak their minds,
practice the religions of their choosing, meet with their compatriots, be
treated fairly by their government, and enjoy access to the necessities
of life.” 37
In addition to individual rights, human rights also necessarily
include group rights, testament of which is the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (known as the
Genocide Convention) adopted on December 9, 1948, 38 one day before
the UDHR’s adoption on December 10. Various classifications of
34. Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 4 (Samantha Power &
Graham Allison eds., 2000). President Roosevelt spoke about “four essential human freedoms”
needed to build the peace after World War II. Each freedom was accompanied by the expression
“everywhere in the world,” except for the fourth where he used “anywhere,” appellations which
rendered these “essential human freedoms” universal. Regarding the last freedom, Professor
Henkin commented: “freedom from fear—fear of enemies and tyrants—was doubtless a
response to threats such as those posed by Adolf Hitler.” Id.
35. UDHR, supra note 32.
36. See UDHR, supra note 32, preamble (pointing out that “disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,”
paving way for “the advent of a world” where “freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people”); George J.
Andreopoulos, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights
[https://perma.cc/2Y2N-5RQW] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (pointing out that “[t]he massive
and systematic human rights abuses committed during World War II, including the Nazi
genocide of Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and other groups, spurred the development of” the UDHR.).
37. Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Organizations: A New Force for Social Change, in
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 230-31 (Samantha Power
& Graham Allison eds., 2000).
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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human rights exist, 39 one of which is division into political-civil rights,
such as the right to participate in one’s own government, and the right
to freedom of expression, among others; and socioeconomic rights,
next below, such as the right to food, shelter, healthcare, and education,
among others.
Socioeconomic human rights are guarantees of freedom, such as
access to nutritious food, livable shelter, affordable healthcare, and
affordable and skill-rich education, to enable individuals to provide
these goods for themselves, without which non-socioeconomic human
rights (i.e., political-civil rights), including even the right to life, ring
hollow. They are the category of rights that Castro referred to as “the
material and cultural goods that human beings need” that governments
must “fight without truce to” provide. 40 The international human rights
instrument which, in the contemporary period, popularized these rights
is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966
but came into force in 1976. 41
It should be clear by now that political-civil rights and
socioeconomic rights are inextricably intertwined. Acknowledging the
complementarity and inseparability of these two generations of human
rights, 42 the ICESCR proclaimed that socioeconomic rights
represented a recognition that consistent with the UDHR, “the ideal of
free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be
39. See infra note 42.
40. Carroll, supra note 2.
41. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Interestingly, given its commitment to and achievements in
this field, Cuba signed this instrument only in September 2008, after Fidel Castro left office, and
is yet to ratify the multilateral treaty (without which it does not formally become part of its
national law). See Ratification Status for Cuba, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=44&Lang=
EN [https://perma.cc/TBZ2-65GR] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
42. The division of human rights into generations is associated with Czech-French jurist
Karel Vasak (1929-2015), who, in 1979, identified and theorized three generations of these
rights coinciding with the tenets of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. See
generally
Karel
Vasak,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights#ref61547 [https://perma.cc/B9X2-PGM8]. For
Vasak, political-civil rights, tied to liberty, typify first-generation rights; socioeconomic rights,
tied to equality, typify second-generation rights; and “collective-developmental” rights of
peoples, such as the right to self-determination, tied to fraternity, typify third-generation rights.
Id. See also Three Generations of Human Rights, GLOBALIZATION 101,
https://www.globalization101.org/three-generations-of-rights/
[https://perma.cc/Y6WM4NR5].
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achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and political
rights.” 43 Similarly, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four-freedom doctrine, an
acknowledged antecedent of the international bill of human rights,
integrated these rights. 44
Many contemporary human rights scholars share this view
regarding the interlinkage between political-civil rights and
socioeconomic rights that counsel against sharp distinction between
these rights. One of these scholars is Henry Shue who stated in his
seminal 1980 work that, contrary to an evolved wisdom about the
government’s role toward political-civil rights being “negative”
mandating non-interference, vis-à-vis socioeconomic rights involving
“positive” action, “the complete fulfilment of each kind of right
involves the performance of multiple kinds of duties.” 45 Put differently,
for Shue, all human rights, whether political-civil rights or
socioeconomic rights, entail three correlative duties: the duty to avoid
depriving, the duty to protect from deprivation, and the duty to aid the
deprived. 46 Little wonder that the Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights held in
Vienna, Austria, in 1993, stated incisively and unambiguously that
“[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated.” 47
III. BRIEF BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CUBAN-AFRICAN
RELATIONS
As they evolved under Castro, two discernible phases mark
Cuban-African relations: (1) the period in the 1960s discussed in this
section, and (2) the period of high energy circa 1975 until 1991 covered
in the next section. 48 A downside to the historical account this section
sets forth is that it injects a periodization into the narrative that, given
43. ICESCR, supra note 41, preamble.
44. Henkin, supra note 34.
45. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
35-64 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, art. 5 (adopted by the World Conference
on
Human
Rights
in
Vienna)
(June
25,
1993),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7VQRKC6].
48 . For clarity’s sake, subsequent reference to these two periods in this Article will
designate them as Phase 1 and Phase 2.
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the seamlessness in real life of the relations analyzed in the two
sections, is ersatz and justified only analytically. Professor Gleijeses
theorized that Cuban involvement in Angola in 1975, discussed later in
this Article, “cannot be understood without looking at the past[,]” that,
for him, began in Algeria (i.e., in Arab Africa, rather than Portuguesespeaking Africa). 49 Secondly, even more persuasive is the fact that
Cuban involvement in Phase 2 mimicked its Phase 1, complete with
similar tools of engagement, only bigger in scale in Phase 2. Thirdly,
as Part IV shows, some scholars, such as again Professor Gleijeses
merge Cuban military and socioeconomic assistance in the two phases
together, rather than separate them. 50
Cuban interest in anticolonial movements in Africa developed
soon after Castro came to power, mainly within the context of covert
operations in support of liberation movements. 51 The Cubans extended
support to indigenous groups fighting for independence in Algeria, and
in the then Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique as well as
to newly independent African countries like Benin, Republic of the
Congo (then Congo Brazzaville), Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, and Mali with whom Havana sought to build relations in
Africa. 52 Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Castro’s personal emissary, travelled
to Cairo, the Egyptian capital, in June of 1959 and Raúl Castro did the
same in July of 1960. 53 Then in September of the same year, Castro
delivered a speech at the United Nations which gave accent to African
issues. 54
49. See infra note 76 and corresponding text.
50. See infra notes 123-25 and corresponding texts.
51 . Piero Gleijeses, Cuba’s Intervention in Africa during the Cold War, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://blog.oup.com/2016/12/cuba-intervention-africa-coldwar/ [https://perma.cc/S4E7-X49P].
52. See Piero Gleijeses, Cuba’s First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965, 28 J. LATIN
AM. STUD. 159, 188 (1996).
53. Id. at 159.
54. Id. See Fidel Castro, Castro Denounces Imperialism and Colonialism, Speech before
the
U.N.
General
Assembly
(Sept.
1960),
available
at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600926.html [https://perma.cc/TB9N-TEGK].
In the speech Castro declared emphatically: “[w]e are ... on the side of the Algerian people, as
we are on the remaining colonial peoples in Africa, and on the side of the Negroes who are
discriminated against in the Union of South Africa. Similarly, we are on the side of those peoples
that wish to be free, not only politically ... but also economically free, for there is one truth which
we should all recognize as being of primary importance, namely, that there can be no political
independence unless there is economic independence, that political independence without
economic independence is a lie; we therefore support the aspirations of all countries to be free
politically and economically.” Id.
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Cuba’s socioeconomic assistance to Africa began in 1960 with a
grant of scholarships to a group of students from Guinea. 55 The Cuban
government sent military and medical supplies to the Algerian National
Liberation Front (“ANLF”) and after Algeria became independent in
July of 1962, established a Cuban military mission in the country. 56
Similarly, Cuba sent a military mission to Ghana in 1961 soon after the
country’s independence in 1957. 57 And following Ernesto “Che”
Guevara’s visit in 1964 with leaders of progressive movements in the
Portuguese countries, by 1965, Cuba sent military missions to these
colonies. 58 By the same token, Cuba dispatched troops to Zaїre and
Congo Brazzaville in 1965. 59 In the same year, in eastern Zaїre, about
120 Cubans, led by “Che” Guevara, fought side by side with Zaїrean
rebels. 60 Cuba also provided assistance to insurgents in Guinea-Bissau
between 1966 and 1974. 61
Algeria typified Cuban relations with Africa at this early period.
“Algeria was Cuba’s headquarters in Africa[,]” 62 a veritable gateway
to Cuban’s entry into the continent in a relationship that went on from
1961 to 1965. 63 Havana supported Algeria because of its progressive
potential from a revolutionary standpoint—and the force of example it
signified for other African countries still under colonial rule and
domination. 64 “Until the overthrow of President [Ahmed] Ben Bella in
1965, Algeria was Cuba’s closest friend on the continent. Cuba
provided both military and civilian assistance not only to the Algerian
republic but also, before their victory to the [freedom fighters] of the
Algerian National Liberation Front.” 65

55. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 165 n.24.
56. Sumnall, supra note 28.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194.
60. Id. at 167 n.28.
61. Id. at 194.
62. Id. at 185.
63. See generally Gleijeses, supra note 52.
64. In the words of the Cuban weekly, Verde Olivo, “[o]f all the countries in Africa, it is
Algeria that takes the lead in helping the movements of national liberation. [ . . . ] It is a model
that inspires other African peoples who are still marching along the slow road to national
independence. The Algerian republic is a beacon for millions and millions of people throughout
Africa.” Id. at 173 (quoting Verde Olivo).
65. Id. at 159.

2019]

CASTRO AND SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS

53

With little concern of possible backlash from France, Cuba under
Castro “chose to help the Algerian revolution in deed and in word.”66
Beginning with words (i.e., verbal gesture), from Castro down, Cuban
officials strongly “proclaimed their country’s support for the Algerian
cause,” including political support for Algeria at the United Nations.67
Next to deed, in May of 1963, Cuba sent a medical mission of fifty-five
medical workers to Algeria, made up of twenty-nine doctors, three
dentists, fifteen nurses, and eight medical technicians. 68 Of the team,
forty-five were men while ten were women. 69 The mission was led by
Minister of Public Health José Ramόn Machodo Ventura, 70 who
believed that, as Public Health Minister, he had a duty to see for himself
firsthand where his doctors were posted. 71 In June of 1964, Cuba
dispatched a second medical mission of sixty-one medical personnel,
thirty-four men and twenty-seven women, comprising twenty-four
doctors, four dentists, twenty-four nurses, and nine medical
technicians. 72
Five observations are in order about this period. First, Havana
operated very much as an independent actor, driven by Cuban domestic
imperatives, rather than as a proxy of Soviet Russia, who would be a
major player later in the ideological rivalry between East and West
signified by the Cold War as it will unfold in Africa.
Second, military assistance and socioeconomic goods
complemented each other hand in glove to the point of indistinction.
Frequently, Cuban military assistance was accompanied with medical
assistance. For example, in August of 1965, during a visit to Havana,
Zaїrean rebel leaders “extracted [from Castro] the promise that Cuba
would send fifty doctors [to the rebel area].” 73 As the following debt of
gratitude from President Bella in October of 1962, months after the
country’s independence July 5 of that year, makes clear, Cuban
assistance included reckonable socioeconomic goods at the heart of this

66. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 161.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 165.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 167 n.28. Thus, “[i]n late September 1965, he appeared, unannounced, in eastern
Zaїre, where some 120 Cubans, led by Che Guevara, were fighting side by side with the Zaїrean
rebels.” Id.
72. Id. at 169.
73. Id. at 167, n.28, quoting the personal diary of Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
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Article, “material and cultural goods that human beings need,” as
Castro subsequently named them:
We will never forget all you did for our refugees in Morocco and
Tunisia. We will never forget how you cared for our orphans and
our wounded. Comrade Fidel Castro, the National Liberation
Front of Algeria has awarded only one medal of honor. We have
awarded it to you. 74

This statement not only speaks to the substantial scale of assistance by
a small country under the threatening shadow of a hostile superpower,
but also to Cuba’s status as a global Good Samaritan. Singling out
medical assistance for quick mention, by the 1970s and beyond, this
assistance rose to a phenomenon whose accretion some scholars come
to praise as “medical internationalism.” 75
Third, whether in military assistance or socioeconomic goods, the
tools of assistance mimicked those that the Cubans would use in the
1970s and 1980s at the highpoint of their engagement in the continent,
the only difference being the larger scale of assistance extended in this
later period. One Cuban official explained that Cuban involvement in
Angola in 1975 “cannot be understood without looking at the past[,]”
which past, in Professor Gleijeses’s assessment, “begins in Algeria,
Cuba’s first love in Africa.” 76 This observation speaks to the
seamlessness referred to earlier that makes periodization of the two eras
covered in this Article artificial and understandable only from an
analytic standpoint.
Fourth, even at this early point in its foreign policy, Cuba
displayed the features of states and other political communities that
some perceptive scholars came to denominate global Good Samaritans.
These countries defined their national interests broadly in a manner that
goes beyond narrow emphasis on realpolitik. 77 What for Cuba made
these gestures particularly exemplary in selflessness was the picture of
a “beggar” offering material help to others that the beggar was not
really in a position to extend: the acts of socioeconomic assistance were
74. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 159, quoting Ahmed Ben Bella (emphasis added).
75 . See generally JOHN M. KIRK & MICHAEL ERISMAN, CUBAN MEDICAL
INTERNATIONALISM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND GOALS (2009).
76. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194. The Cuban official in question, among the individuals
Professor Gleijeses interviewed for his article, was Manuel Agramonte. See id. at 194 n.151. See
also PIERO GLEIJESES, CONFLICTING MISSIONS: HAVANA, WASHINGTON, AND AFRICA, 19591976 (2002) (analyzing missions with an unbroken time range from 1959 until 1976).
77. See infra notes 182-83 and corresponding texts.
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“offered at a time when the exodus of doctors from Cuba following the
revolution had forced the government to stretch its resources while
launching its domestic programs to increase mass access to health
care.” 78
To be sure, “[o]ne may argue that helping Algeria was in Cuba’s
[national] interest, because Cuba needed friends in the Third World.”79
Listen, for example, to this statement attributed to Jorge Serguera,
Cuba’s ambassador in Algiers, capital of Algeria: “We will never forget
the visit of President Ben Bella to our country one day before the
Caribbean crisis [the Cuban Missile Crisis] exploded. Nor will we ever
forget Algeria’s international solidarity toward us.” 80 However, “one
cannot deny that in helping those whom they considered victims of
aggression, the Cubans risked tangible interest,” such as good
relationship with the French government then under Charles de
Gaulle. 81
Fifth, while the relations with Algeria exemplified Cuba’s
investment in Africa, those relations were by no means limited to
Algeria. Instead, driven by its Marxist beliefs and agenda, Cuba worked
to exploit opportunities for relationship with countries in the stilldecolonizing region that were not limited to any one independent state.
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September of
1960, Castro posited “[w]e are [ . . . ] on the side of the Algerian people,
as we are on the remaining colonial peoples in Africa, and on the side
of the Negroes who are discriminated against in the Union of South
Africa.” 82 And during his visit to Africa in 1964, Che Guevara,
Castro’s right-hand man, after stopping for talks with Algerian leader
Ben Bella, toured Bamako, Brazzaville, Conakry, Accra, Cotonou, and
Cairo (the latter twice) before heading back to Havana on March 14,
1964. 83

78. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 166. The quote about a beggar offering help came from
José Ramόn Machado Venture, Minister of Public Health, embodied in a note to Professor
Gleijeses in July of 1995. According to the Health Minister, “[i]n 1959[,] Cuba had about 6,000
doctors, of whom some 1,500 had left the country by late 1962, and an equal number had asked
to leave the country and the most we could do was to delay their departure for a while.” Id. at
166, n.25 (internal quotes deleted).
79. Id. at 191.
80. Id. at 173.
81. Id. at 191.
82. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 182.
83. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 188.
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IV. MEASURING THE SIZE OF CUBAN SOCIOECONOMIC
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA CIRCA 1975 TO 1991
Part IV of this Article highlights the quantum of Cuban
socioeconomic human rights contributions in Africa in the period under
review. Two observations are in order. First, the activities presented
here are information in the public domain that, for example, do not
include events below the radar of publicity, such as diplomatic
initiatives. Moreover, given the climate of clandestineness that
shrouded aspects of superpower competition in Africa during the Cold
War, in which Cuba featured, there could have been some measures of
assistance that went unreported. 84 It is not hard to imagine that these
under-the-radar activities include health, housing, and other
socioeconomic goods at the focus of this Article. Second, given that
socioeconomic goods often tracked military assistance in the arsenal of
Cuban aid, this presentation makes no sharp demarcation between the
two tools.
The ensuing discussion proceeds chronologically, based on the
timing and progression of Cuban involvement: Angola, then Ethiopia,
then Mozambique, and finally other portions of Africa like Namibia
and South Africa. In Angola, the freedom-fighting group Cuba pitched
its tent with and therefore the beneficiary of its assistance was the
Popular Movement of Liberation (“MPLA”) under the leadership of
Agostinho Neto. 85 Compared to the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola (“FNLA”) and National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (“UNITA”) backed by the United States and minority-ruled
South Africa, Cuba assessed the MPLA as the most progressive entity,
judged by revolutionary credentials or potentials, that it could work
with. 86 Growth of Cuban involvement in Angola and Mozambique
during the 1970s coincided with the breakdown of peace negotiations
in Portugal in 1975. 87 Initially, in Angola, Cuba sent three thousand
combat troops and three hundred military advisers, along with tanks

84. See Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that “[t]here has been small Cuban covert
operations in Africa in the 1960s in support of liberation movements”).
85. See Sumnall, supra note 28. The MPLA acronym and those of its two rivals, the FNLA
and UNITA, are all in Portuguese.
86. See id.
87. See The Angolan Civil War (1975-2002): A Brief History, SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY
ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002brief-history [https://perma.cc/ATK7-6E4E].
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and fighter aircraft to the MPLA. 88 Henceforth, the number of troops
stationed in the country steadily increased: from twenty-four thousand
in March 1976, to about forty thousand by 1984, and about fifty-five
thousand in 1988. 89 Cuban records coupled with confirmation by
Soviet defense officials showed that the decision to send Cuban troops
in November 1975 to Angola was a Cuban initiative. It was a course of
action based on the Castro regime’s long-standing ties with the
Angolan nationalist movement led by Agostinho Neto. At least
initially, the Soviet Union had no hand in that decision because it was
preoccupied with détente meant to tone down the Cold War and achieve
improved relations with the United States. 90 The US government
subsequently confirmed this narrative. 91
In Mozambique, by the mid-1980s, Cuba sent seven hundred
Cuban military and seventy civilian personnel. 92 Compared to Angola
and Ethiopia, Cuban engagement in Mozambique was low key. 93
Cuban involvement in Ethiopia in September of 1977 followed the
Somalian invasion of Ethiopia. The invasion was Somalian leader Siad
Barre’s attempt to realize the irredentist dream of a Greater Somalia on
the Horn of Africa. He took advantage of the weakened state of
Ethiopia after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by
Mengistu Haile Mariam. 94 Cuba sent in 17,600 combat troops,
including 6,000 military advisers. 95 These forces were well backed by
Soviet military equipment, including air power, worth about US$1
88. See Fidel Castro: How Cuban Leader Changed Southern Africa, BBC (Nov. 28,
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38130554 [https://perma.cc/FGL2-B9F6].
89 . PIERO GLEIJESES, THE CUBAN DRUMBEAT: CASTRO’S WORLDVIEW: CUBAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN A HOSTILE WORLD 34 (2009).
90. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194. Then Soviet defense official Vasily Kuznetsov stated
that the idea to intervene was part of Cuba’s independent policy toward Africa that “had
originated in Havana, not Moscow.” Id. Then Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin,
spoke similarly when he stated that the Cubans sent their troops “on their own initiative and
without consulting us [i.e. with Moscow].” Id. at 194 n.150. See Conflicting Missions: Secret
Cuban Documents on History of African Involvement, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
(April 1, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/ [https://perma.cc/8CDE2YUE] (stating that Cuba made the decision to send troops without informing the Soviet Union
and deployed those troops without Soviet assistance for the first two months).
91. Gleijeses, supra note 51, at 3 (stating that the CIA concluded years later that the
intervention was a “unilateral Cuban operation designed in great haste”).
92. Sumnall, supra note 28.
93. See id.
94. See Martin Plaut, How Fidel Castro Became a Hero and a Villain in the Horn of Africa,
QUARTZ AFRICA (9, 2016), https://qz.com/africa/859579/in-ethiopia-and-somalia-fidel-castroslegacy-is-very-different/ [https://perma.cc/3L7E-VZVY].
95. Id.
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billion. 96 Prior to the invasion, both Moscow and Havana maintained
relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, but switched decisively to the side
of Ethiopia after attempts to reconcile the two sides failed. 97
Overall, under Castro, for a period spanning “over thirty years”
from when it began in the 1960s, “Cuban soldiers and officers [were]
on duty-service or [ . . . ] fought hand-in-hand with African soldiers and
officers in [Africa] for national independence or against foreign
aggression [ . . . .]” 98 It did not come without cost. Within the same
period, particularly during the second phase of Havana’s involvement
in the region, about ten thousand Cuban soldiers died fighting for the
freedom of Africans. 99 During the same period, over eighty thousand
Cuban “civilian cooperators [ . . . ] rendered internationalist services in
Africa [ . . . ].” 100 The number included 24,714 doctors, dentists, nurses
and health-care technicians, as well as professors, teachers, engineers,
and other skilled workers, numbering in the tens of thousands. 101 In
education alone, about “30,000 Africans studied in Cuba on full
scholarships funded by the Cuban government[,]” 102 and Cuban
educational institutions “graduated 26,294 professionals and
technicians” plus another 5,850 trained there. 103 While in disbursing its
assistance, Cuba focused on revolutionary regimes, its support actually
extended to both capitalist states as well as to those treading the path
of socialism. 104 One evidence in support of this proposition is the fact
that Cuba under Castro played a major role in the Non-Aligned
Movement (“NAM”) second only to former Yugoslavia. 105 It was the
only founding member then from Latin America.
96. Id. (stating that “[a]t one time a Soviet aircraft was landing in Addis Ababa every 20
minutes”).
97. Id.
98. Fidel Castro, Speech Delivered by Commander-In-Chief Fidel Castro at the South
African
Parliament
(Sept.
4,
1998),
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1998/ing/f040998i.html[https://perma.cc/82U4-FLN6].
99. See Sean Jacobs, If Africa is a Country, Then Fidel Castro is One of Our National
Heroes, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (Nov. 26, 2016), https://africasacountry.com/2016/11/viva-fidel
[https://perma.cc/2MVM-9TRT].
100. Castro, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Gleijeses, supra note 51.
103. Castro, supra note 98.
104 . See DOMINGUEZ, supra note 30, at 184-218 (discussing Cuba’s relations with
capitalist countries).
105. See Int’l Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, Cuba and the Non-Aligned Movement,
NEW DELHI TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.newdelhitimes.com/cuba-and-the-nonaligned-movement123/ [https://perma.cc/C44R-ZTBJ]. The NAM is a forum of about
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On the surface, from the standpoint of scale, these measures of
assistance may not seem like a lot. But closely considered, this is
phenomenal for a diminutive country of limited natural resources
geographically closely located to the United States and under the
behemoth’s siege of economic embargo, 106 with the result that its
economic lifeline depended on assistance from the Soviet Union, the
United States’ bitter rival. 107 As commentators point out regarding
Cuban casualty emanating from its engagement in Angola and
Mozambique, especially Angola, the estimated fourteen thousand
soldiers who died there dwarfed the number of American fatalities in
Vietnam. 108

120 developing states (Third World), not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc,
neither the “First World” of capitalism nor the “Second World” of socialism (whatever still
remains of the latter club, in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe
symptomized by the breakup of the Soviet Union). Next after the United Nations, NAM is
believed to be the largest single grouping of states worldwide. During the highpoint of Cuban
involvement in Africa that this Article analyzes, the NAM had a membership of about 90
developing world states, compared to the estimated 120 member states of today. See, e.g.,
Member
States
[of
the]
Non-Aligned
Movement,
WORLD
DATA,
https://www.worlddata.info/alliances/non-aligned-movement.php
[https://perma.cc/7MT6UNQV].
106. Dating back unbrokenly from March of 1958, the United States maintains the most
consolidated and punishing set of embargoes that it reserves for any one country against Cuba.
See Cuba: The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact On Economic And Social Rights,
AMNESTY
INT’L
(Sept.
2,
2009),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/44000/amr250072009en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KLQ-4FA4] (pointing out, citing a US government agency, that “[t]he
embargo on Cuba is the most comprehensive set of US sanctions on any country, including the
other countries designated by the US government to be state sponsors of terrorism”). As of 2018,
the embargo is enforced mainly through six statutes: The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms-Burton Act of 1966, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Id. Since 1992, the UN General Assembly has passed a
resolution every year condemning the embargoes whose negative socioeconomic impacts on the
Cuban population it views as a violation of the UN Charter and of international law. Id. See also
End
Embargo
on
Cuba,
U.S.
Is
Urged,
BBC
(Sept.
2,
2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8232907.stm [https://perma.cc/MZP4-NG86] (story on the
Amnesty Int’l Report). For example, in 2014, 188 countries out of the 193 members of the U.N.
General Assembly, voted yes on a nonbinding resolution to lift the sanctions, with only the U.S.
and Israel voting no and three Pacific states (Palau, Marshall Island, and Micronesia) abstaining.
Mirjan Donath & Louis Charbonneau, For 23rd Time, U.N. Nations Urge End to U.S. Embargo
on Cuba, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-un/for-23rd-timeu-n-nations-urge-end-to-u-s-embargo-on-cuba-idUSKBN0IH1RN20141028
[https://perma.cc/5HE9-3Y7Y].
107. See Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 and corresponding text.
108. Jacobs, supra note 99.
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A second factor, beyond raw numbers, that made Cuban
assistance, including socioeconomic aid, phenomenal, is that it added
up instructively to change the balance of power in the southern African
region, from Angola and Mozambique all the way through Namibia
and South Africa, to the benefit of Cuba and proponents of African
decolonization. 109 The South Africans were on the verge of crushing
the MPLA when Cuba airlifted thirty-six thousand combat troops into
Angola. 110 The scale of Cuban assistance strengthened the hand of the
MPLA in its struggle against FNLA and UNITA in the civil war that
engulfed Angola to the point that, with the encouragement of the US
government, South African forces invaded Angola on the side of the
FNLA and UNITA. 111 But it was too little, too late, as the MPLA
coasted to victory against its rivals, driving South African forces out of
Angola. Cuban military victory in Angola helped speed the collapse of
minority rule in South Africa based on the policy of apartheid or
separateness (with the socioeconomic immiseration it spelled for
Blacks), paving the way for majority rule in the country. 112 It also
simultaneously helped bring independence to Namibia, a trust territory
that rather than prepare for independence, consistent with the
stringencies of UN trust mandate, the minority regime in South Africa
instead extended its policy of apartheid into. It was this weight of
significance that Nelson Mandela had in mind when he pointed out that
the Cuban military victory over the South African army “destroyed the
myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor [ . . . ] [and] inspired
the fighting masses of South Africa. [It] was the turning point for the
liberation of our continent—and of my people—from the scourge of
apartheid.” 113
109. See generally PIERO GLEIJESES, VISIONS OF FREEDOM: HAVANA, WASHINGTON,
PRETORIA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1976-1991 (2013).
110. Id.; see Conflicting Missions, supra note 90.
111. See Keith Somerville, It’s 30 Years since Cuito Cuanavale: How the Battle Redefined
South Africa, THE CONVERSATION (May 29, 2017), https://theconversation.com/its-30-yearssince-cuito-cuanavale-how-the-battle-redefined-southern-africa-78134 [https://perma.cc/VTJ5BA38]. Regarding the US encouragement of the invasion, see Gleijeses, supra note 51;
Conflicting Missions, supra note 90. The latter source, a declassified document, indicated that,
contrary to then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s (re)presentation to Congress, “the
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] helped the South Africans ferry arms to key battlefronts.” Id.
Kissinger reasoned that success in Angola by way of defeating a pro-communist regime would
boost US prestige and his own reputation, battered by the fall of South Vietnam in April of 1975.
Gleijeses, supra note 51.
112. Id.; see Gleijeses, supra note 51.
113. Nelson Mandela, quoted in Gleijeses, supra note 51, at 188.
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In many ways, the victory immensely benefited Cuban national
security interests. This is why it is easy to understand why, as Gleijeses
points out, Cuba insisted that its withdrawal from Angola be conducted
in a manner that created a positive legacy of Cuban influence in African
history. 114 First, until Cuba’s successful engagement in Angola, extracontinental military interventions were the preserve of the two
superpowers, and a few West European countries. 115 Cuba’s massive
use of force, first in Angola between 1975 and 1976 to repel a South
African invasion, and next in Ethiopia in 1978 to help defeat a Somali
invasion, were stunning developments that became even more
impressive when it is considered that not even the Soviet Union sent
this scale of troops beyond its immediate borders in those heady years
of the Cold War between East and West. 116 These factors were the
reason Professor Piero Gleijeses praised Cuban foreign policy there, in
its unprecedentedness, as “a policy without equal” in modern times.117
Professor Jorge I. Dominguez reasoned similarly when he portrayed
Cuba under Castro as a diminutive country which boldly and repeatedly
exercised and projected the foreign policy of a major power. 118 And to
the delight and pride of many Africans, Afro-Cubans played a visible
role in the Cuban campaigns in Africa during this second phase in
Cuban-African relations. 119 This helped give teeth to Castro’s
campaign against racism and related prejudice like xenophobia. 120

114. Piero Gleijeses, The United States and Castro’s Cuba in the Cold War, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (May 5, 2017), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0073.xml [https://perma.cc/6PM7-KDXN].
115. Gleijeses, supra note 51.
116. Id.
117. GLEIJESES, supra note 89 at 9.
118. See generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 30.
119. See, e.g., Frank F. Taylor, Revolution, Race, and Some Aspects of Foreign Relations
in Cuba Since 1959, 18 CUBAN STUD. 19 (1988) (observing that more than domestic policy,
foreign policy, including missions in Africa with the participation of Afro-Cubans, has promoted
“full integration” of blacks into Cuban society); Sean Jacobs, To So Many Africans, Fidel Castro
is
a
Hero:
Here’s
Why,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
30,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/30/africa-fidel-castro-nelson-mandelacuba [https://perma.cc/KRY5-RS6J] (reflecting on a “paradox” in Cuba’s African policy
embedded in “a progressive foreign policy on race,” including missions abroad with AfroCuban participation, “at odds with the Communist Party’s failure to reflect the full range of
Cuba’s racial diversity in its leadership structures or to fully address race politics”).
120. See infra Part IV.C. (analyzing the interaction and intersection of Cuban national
security and service to the International Socialist Movement, particularly the last portion of that
discussion).
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Second, Cuban engagement in Africa under Castro, including the
access to socioeconomic goods that it afforded to revolutionary and
non-revolutionary regimes alike, provided another platform for Cuban
resistance to US power. As Professor Gleijeses recounts, when Castro
attempted to spread revolution in Latin America, the United States
responded by containing the spread of his influence within the
hemisphere, including trying to overthrow him. 121 Thus, the 1960s
turned out to be years of unceasing hostility between Washington and
Havana, but by the 1970s, particularly under the Jimmy Carter
administration from 1977 to 1980, relations warmed up and the storm
seemed to abate. 122 Castro has consolidated his power and partly
because of the failure of the Cuban regime’s guerrilla offensives in
Latin America, US officials believed Castro had lost his zeal to export
revolution abroad. 123 This assumption proved incorrect with successive
successful Cuban interventions, first in Angola and soon after in
Ethiopia with tectonic impacts from the Horn of Africa all the way
down to Namibia and South Africa. The unanticipated forays dismayed
US officials who accused the Soviet Union of masterminding the
interventions. 124 In short, compared to Latin America where
Washington successfully flexed its muscles at Cuba’s expense, in
southern Africa, to the utter embarrassment, if not humiliation, of the
US government, “Cuba changed the course of history[,] despite
Washington’s best efforts to prevent it.” 125

121. Gleijeses, supra note 114.
122. Id.; Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Jimmy Carter in Cuba, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 14,
2015),
https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carter-in-cuba-46109
[https://perma.cc/EH2JXB8Q] (commenting on how in 1977, President Carter removed all travel restrictions on
Americans to travel to Cuba and took the first big steps toward normalization of relations
between the two countries while the Cold War still raged).
123. Regarding the failure of revolutionary activities in Latin America instigated by the
Castro regime, see, e.g., Javier Farje, Fidel Castro: A Latin American Story, ALJAZEERA (Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/161129085116132.html
[https://perma.cc/ZKT6-CUUK] (observing that “guerrillas tried to repeat the Cuban
experience, … but were mercilessly crushed by national armies, many of whose officers had
been educated in the dubious art of counter-insurgency by the US at the School of the
Americas in Panama,” with the result that “[b]y 1967, when Che Guevara [Castro’s personal
emissary] was executed in Bolivia after he failed in his efforts to form a guerrilla group to invade
his native Argentina, armed struggle as an instrument of change had fizzled out”).
124. See supra notes 90-91 and corresponding texts.
125. Gleijeses, supra note 114, at 172.
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V. DEFENDING SOCIALIST VALUES “TO THE LAST ATOM”: A
MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Explaining the reform of the “special period in time of peace”
from 1990 until 2008, marked by termination of Soviet ideological and
economic support, Castro advised Cubans “to have trust in what the
government and party are doing[,]” elaborating that “[t]hey are
defending, to the last atom, socialist ideas, principles[,] and goals.”126
Leading to this viewpoint, Castro observed that even though his regime
“do[es] not have a smidgen of capitalism or neo-liberalism” in its vein,
nonetheless it faced “a world completely ruled by neo-liberalism and
capitalism.” 127 However, the occurrence cannot and should not spell
surrender. 128 Instead, it means the regime must “ad[a]pt to the reality
of that [changed] world[,]” while staying true to its ideals and goals,
precisely what Cuba is doing courageously and cool-headedly. 129 Cuba
reached this crossroad in its revolutionary history because, under
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union chose to end its subsidies to
Cuba, the result of perestroika, economic restructuring in the Soviet
homeland coupled with a “new thinking” in external relations.130
In performing its duties for the international socialist movement,
Castro’s Cuba utilized socioeconomic instruments that the literature
tends to lump together with military assistance. 131 This Article has
disaggregated these material and cultural goods human beings need.132
What remains in Part V is to put these socioeconomic goods in analytic
perspective. To restate, this Article argues that the promotion of these
socioeconomic goods in Africa were driven by a set of three
interrelated variables: (1) domestic Cuban national security interest, (2)
service to the international socialist movement, and (3) the synergistic
interaction of these two variables. Additionally, this Article makes a
case for why Cuba under Castro deserves due recognition as a global
126. LEYCESTER COLTMAN, THE REAL FIDEL CASTRO 291-92 (2003).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 260-61, 276. For details on the Soviet leader’s change programs, see, e.g.,
Martin McCauley & Dominic Lieven, The Gorbachev’s Era: Perestroika and Glasnost,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia/The-Gorbachev-eraperestroika-and-glasnost [https://perma.cc/8BK6-WPGM]; David Holloway, Gorbachev’s New
Thinking, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 1, 1989), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russiafsu/1989-02-01/gorbachevs-new-thinking [https://perma.cc/D434-9RA6].
131. See supra note 30 and corresponding text.
132. See supra note 31 and corresponding text.
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Good Samaritan, one of a rare example from the socialist world in an
academic literature now dominated by exclusive attention to capitalistoriented states. 133 The basis for the argument is the country’s broad
view of national security achieved through pursuit of principled
policies abroad that consistently and systematically infused human
rights in external policies.
A. Pursuit of Socioeconomic Human Rights in Service to Cuban
National Security
Colloquially speaking, “national security” refers to the security of
a country, including its people, institutions, and economy. 134 It is a
bounden duty of any government. 135 National security is an
indeterminate concept that different scholars define and operationalize
differently. 136 Two of the most memorable of these definitions are by
the writer Walter Lippman and the political scientist Harold D.
Lasswell. Lasswell wrote laconically in 1950 that “[t]he distinctive
meaning of national security [ . . . ] is freedom from foreign
dictation.” 137 For his part, in a 1943 definition, Lippmann stated that a
state possesses this property “when it does not have to sacrifice its
legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain
them by war.” 138 More recently and most elaborately, Harold Brown,
US Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter, stated that a
country has national security when it is able to perform certain key
governing functions like preserve its “physical integrity and territory,”
“control its borders,” “maintain its economic relations with the rest of
133. See ALISON BRYSK, GLOBAL GOOD SAMARITANS: HUMAN RIGHTS AS FOREIGN
POLICY (2009). See also PHILIP C. AKA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS:
BUILDING THE RECORD OF A MORAL SUPERPOWER (2017) (extending the argument for
application of human rights in external affairs to Nigeria, a capitalist state).
134. See Morton Berkowitz & P. G. Bock, National Security, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2008), https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-andlaw/political-science-and-government/military-affairs-nonnaval/national-security
[https://perma.cc/FR99-YS2A] (defining the concept, from a social science standpoint, as “the
ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external attacks,” specifically as “the manner
in which nations plan, make, or evaluate the decisions and policies designed” to increase their
ability to protect their internal values from external attacks).
135. See id.
136. See generally Anton Grizold, The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary
World, 11 INT’L J. WORLD PEACE 37 (1994).
137. JOSEPH J. ROMM, DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NONMILITARY ASPECTS 79
(1993).
138. Id. at 5.

2019]

CASTRO AND SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS

65

the world on reasonable terms,” and prevent its political system from
external disruption. 139
Governments use various techniques, including political,
diplomatic, economic, and military means to promote their countries’
national security. 140 Creative governments also embark on regional and
international initiatives designed to reinforce domestic measures in
promoting their national security. 141 This is the key to the strong link
between domestic and foreign policies. Some observers who have
commented on this topic consider foreign policy an extension of
domestic policy by non-domestic means. 142 It was this interlinkage that
former US President Dwight Eisenhower, a former army general, had
in mind when, in his farewell, he advised the United States to beware
of the military-industrial complex, because of the threat this
phenomenon poses for democratic government. 143 The militaryindustrial complex is an opportunistic league between defense
contractors and military interests in the US government to keep defense
spending up beyond the real military needs of the country. 144 For
Eisenhower, it is foolhardy to undermine at home the very goals the

139. CYNTHIA ANN WATSON, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 281
(2d ed., 2008).
140 . See, e.g., Jeff Farlin, Instruments of National Power: How America Earned
Independence, Master of Strategic Studies Degree Thesis, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (2014),
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/87.pdf [https://perma.cc/23HE-9D9L]; DENNIS
M. DREW & DONALD M. SHAW, MAKING STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL
SECURITY PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS 36-44 (1988).
141. See, e.g., White House, National Security Strategy, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
ARCHIVE
(Feb.
2015),
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5NL-KSPS] (incuding issues like “combat[ting] the persistent threat of
terrorism,” “prevent[ing] the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction,” and
“confront[ing] climate change”); Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy Of The United
Kingdom: Security In An Interdependent World, CABINET OFFICE (Mar. 2008),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/228539/7291.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL2H-HJYD] (listing issues of security challenges to
include terrorism, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, transnationally
organized crimes, global instability and conflict as well as failed and fragile states, civil
emergencies, strengthening and reforming the international system, state-led threats to the UK,
climate changes, and energy competition).
142. See, e.g., Carmen Elena Dorobăţ, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy are but One
System”: Mises on International Organizations and the World Trade Organization, 19
INDEPENDENT REV. 357 (2015).
143 . Ike’s Warning of Military Expansion, 50 Years Later, NPR (Jan. 17, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/01/17/132942244/ikes-warning-of-military-expansion-50-yearslater [https://perma.cc/9PX5-FY4J].
144. Id.
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United States seeks, ab initio, to achieve abroad through design and
implementation of a coherent foreign policy. 145
Cuban foreign policy under Castro was fundamentally
nationalistic. 146 Castro understood the importance of promoting at
home the very goals Cuba seeks to achieve abroad through the
instrumentality of a well-designed and implemented foreign policy.
Accordingly, it adopted a broader definition of national security going
beyond political-military concerns to encompass socioeconomic
benefits that it then exported abroad. Although at his death some critics
called him a “radical bent on transformational, alternative global
development,” 147 even his American detractors conceded that Castro
was “inspired by a messianic sense of mission to aid his people.”148
Although he occasionally showed sensitivity to Soviet views on issues
bearing on the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the
official positions of the Kremlin were rarely the decisive factor in his
pursuit of causes either at home or abroad. 149
To the very end, Castro propagated production of socioeconomic
benefits, as a matter of human rights, rather than privilege, that leaders
must “fight without truce” to provide for citizens. 150 It was not a
guarantee limited domestically only to Cubans. Instead, from the tone
of his voice, the “human beings” penciled down for these benefits
included Cubans at home and non-Cubans abroad alike.
B. Pursuit of Socioeconomic Human Rights in Service to the
International Socialist Movement
Another variable accounting for Castro’s contributions to
socioeconomic human rights in Africa was service to the international
socialist movement. Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State under
Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, observed that Castro “was
probably the most genuine revolutionary leader then [in the 1970s] in
power.” 151 Kissinger was and is still a realist and believes that states
145. Id.
146. See generally H. MICHAEL ERISMAN, CUBA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
ANATOMY OF A NATIONALIST FOREIGN POLICY (1985).
147. See Corrales, supra note 12.
148. GLEIJESES, supra note 89, at 6.
149 . CIA, Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE (Nov. 21, 1967), https:/nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MT43-T4Q9].
150. See supra notes 2-4.
151. See Gleijeses, supra note 51 (quoting Kissinger’s memoirs).
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are unitary actors in world politics that must use self-help to navigate
an international system without a world government (“anarchy”). 152
Commentators not influenced by realist theory have expressed
similar views regarding the commitment of Castro to international
communism. 153 These include Bill Bonnar, who, in his eulogy of
Castro, praised the deceased former Cuban leader as “a giant of
socialism.” 154 He elaborated in a statement arguably speaking to the
intertwining of domestic and external policies next below, that
“Castro’s entire political life was given to the struggle for Cuban
independence[,] and the struggle for liberation and socialism all over
the world.” 155 Bonnar was national secretary of the Scottish Socialist
Party; 156 so, there may be observers who will consider his views as
lacking in objectivity since, like Castro, he belonged in the
international socialist movement. But there were non-socialist
commentators who voiced similar assessments. 157 One such
commentator was Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labor Party in the
United Kingdom, who eulogized Castro as a “huge figure of modern
history, national independence[,] and 20th century socialism.” 158 As
previously mentioned, Corbyn praised Castro “as an internationalist
and a champion of social justice.” 159 He gave Castro credit for many
achievements, including building world-class health and education
systems, a record of international solidary abroad, and support for the
decolonization struggle in Angola which helped end apartheid in South
Africa. 160
The connection of all this to socioeconomic human rights is that,
in serving the cause of international communism in Africa, Cuba
utilized an assortment of assistance that ranged beyond conventional
political-military assistance to include socioeconomic goods. Castro’s
embrace of NAM and Cuba’s leadership of the Movement second only
152 . See, e.g., Robert W. Merry, The Morality of Kissinger’s Realism, NATIONAL
INTEREST (Apr. 25, 2013), https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/kissingers-moral-foreignpolicy-8398 [https://perma.cc/978J-CPWQ]; Walter Isaacson, Henry Kissinger Reminds Us
Why Realism Matters, TIME (Sept. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3275385/henry-kissinger/
[https://perma.cc/F3AM-VX3Z].
153. See infra notes 154-59 and corresponding texts.
154. Bonnar, supra note 7.
155. Id.
156. See Bonnar, supra note 7 (last sentence).
157. See supra notes 158-60.
158. Bloom, supra note 9.
159. Id.
160. Id.

68

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

to Yugoslavia, meant that these socioeconomic benefits were not
limited to revolutionary states and regimes. Instead the benefits were
occasionally extended to non-revolutionary states, especially those that
touted themselves non-aligned. From 1979 to 1982, Castro was
president of the Conference of NAM held in Havana. For him, the
battle against imperialism was something larger than the Cold War and
resistance of US hegemony; it was a battle against despair and
oppression in the developing world. 161 Accordingly, as the next section
shows, Castro used his leadership of this movement to draw attention
to global issues of interest to developing countries.
C. Interaction and Intersection of Cuban National Security and
Service to the International Socialist Movement
This section deals with events that do not belong in the first two
categories because, synergistically, those events bestride both
categories. Jeremy Corbyn’s assessment which praised Castro as a
“huge figure of [ . . . ] national independence[,] and 20th century
socialism,” 162 arguably falls into this category. So too is the more
elaborate evaluation by Bill Bonnar to the effect that “Castro’s entire
political life was given to the struggle for Cuban independence[,] and
the struggle for liberation and socialism all over the world.” 163
There are three such events that illustratively we highlight here.
The first is represented in Castro’s belief, demonstrated in words and
deeds, in the indivisibility of political-civil rights and socioeconomic
rights. Recall the comment earlier in this Article regarding the
complementarity of political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights and
therefore the inseparability of these guarantees. 164 Inspired by this
wisdom or despite it, in a 1979 message to the United Nations General
Assembly, Castro gave a speech that demonstrated the interlinkage
between political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights, specifically
how lack of attention to socioeconomic human rights can have
consequences for political-civil rights, particularly “the rights to life
and human dignity”:
Why should some people walk barefoot, so that others can travel
in luxurious cars? Why should some live for thirty-five years, so
161.
162.
163.
164.

See generally GLEIJESES, supra note 89.
See Bloom, supra note 9.
See Bonnar, supra note 7.
See supra notes 42-43.
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that others can live for seventy years? Why should some be
miserably poor, so that others can be hugely rich? I speak on behalf
of the children in the world who do not have a piece of bread. I
speak on behalf of the sick who have no medicine, of those whose
rights to life and human dignity have been denied. 165

Castro made another connection between the two categories of
rights in 2002, when, in a speech that year, he pointed out that “the ever
more sophisticated weapons piling up in the arsenals of the wealthiest
and the mightiest can kill the illiterate, the ill, the poor and the hungry[,]
but they cannot kill ignorance, illnesses, poverty or hunger.” 166 There
were times when Castro took full advantage of the platform of the
NAM to draw attention to global issues that affected the developing
world. One such instance was in October 1979 when in his capacity as
both President of the NAM as well as of Cuba he gave a widelyapplauded speech on the disparity between the world’s rich and poor.167
The second of the issues straddling the matter of national security
and service to international communism that this subsection covers, a
problem common to the developing world, is the debt crisis. Castro
denounced the problem of Third World debt, going so far as to host
five international conferences on the issue. 168 This should be viewed as
another angle in measuring the size of Cuban contribution to
socioeconomic human rights under him, bound to benefit Africans
more, given the status of Africa as the poorest continent in the world
from the standpoint of poverty alleviation. 169 For, despite the natural
165. COLTMAN, supra note 126, at 245.
166. Fidel Castro, Speech at the Int’l Conference on Financing for Development (Mar. 21,
2002),
available
at
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2002/ing/f210302i.html
[https://perma.cc/V4AF-KDMU]
167. See COLTMAN, supra note 126, at 245.
168. Id. at 255.
169. See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
(1989). The 1989 report focused on developing human skills and efforts in Africa, while
reiterating the emphasis of previous reports on agricultural productivity (the main element that
for many critics made it a conservative report). Following this conservative diagnosis,
prescription for change, as the World Bank saw it, were liberalization aimed at freeing individual
initiative at the grassroots level and above and improved governance defined to include more
democracy. Thomas G. Karis, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Fall 1990), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/199009-01/sub-saharan-africa-crisis-sustainable-growth [https://perma.cc/SQ3T-UD7V] (book
review of the World Bank’s 1989 report). On the Bank’s 2016 report, the official who introduced
it, one Ms. Carolina Sanchez-Paramo of the Bank’s Poverty and Equity Global Practice unit,
posited that in the worst sense of the term, Sub-Saharan African holds the key to success globally
in the war against poverty. See War on Extreme Poverty Faces Challenges in Africa: World
Bank, FRANCE24 (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180919-war-extreme-
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wealth of many African countries, many Africans live below the
poverty line, as defined by United Nations institutions, compared to
countries in other continents. 170
A third and last issue is the fight against racism and xenophobia.
Castro assessed the current economic order in the world dominated by
the United States and other industrialized countries to be “not only
unjust, cruel, inhumane,” but also as well “racist.” 171 This line of
thought continued in his speech at the UN Conference against Racism
in Durban, South Africa, in September of 2001 with fourteen thousand
delegates from 194 countries in attendance. There, Castro opined that
rather than being a natural human instinct, racism, racial
discrimination, and xenophobia are sociocultural and political
phenomenon “born directly of wars, military conquests, slavery and the
individual or collective exploitation of the weakest by the most
powerful in the history of human societies.” 172 In addition to the issue
of reparations for slavery of Blacks, Castro focused his speech on
alleged Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians whom he called “victim[s]
of the most fierce persecution, discrimination and injustice that history

poverty-faces-challenges-africa-world-bank [https://perma.cc/V7HQ-U9AK]. Put differently,
she said, the war against poverty in the world “will be won and lost” in Sub-Saharan Africa. Id.
She elaborated that as more states lift people out of poverty, a higher share of the world’s poor
will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that already has high poverty rates of fortyone percent, and slow progress. A common theme unifying these two reports over the timespan
of nearly one full generation in-between them, is that Africa registered little progress on the war
against poverty.
170 . See supra note 169. See also World Bank, No Poverty, WORLD BANK,
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgatlas/archive/2017/SDG-01-no-poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/57K4-6KAU] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (showing that in 2017 about fifty
percent of all people in extreme poverty in the world, defined as income of 1.90 U.S. dollars a
day, lived in Sub-Saharan Africa).
171. Fidel Castro, Key Address by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba
at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance,
Durban,
South
Africa
(Sept.
1,
2001),
available
at
https://www.un.org/WCAR/statements/0109cubaE.htm [https://perma.cc/4K6P-M4FN].
172. Id.
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has known.” 173 He pled for an “end to the ongoing genocide against”
them while the world watched rather than come to their help. 174
Castro accused the United States and the industrialized economies
of being “beneficiaries of the conquest and colonization, of slavery, of
the ruthless exploitation and the extermination of hundreds of millions
of people born in the countries that today constitute the Third
World.” 175 In a statement released ahead of the conference published
in the Cuban official newspaper Granma, the Cuban government
posited that although apartheid has been abolished in South Africa, “at
least 250 million people on the planet are still living under the yoke of
segregation and servitude.” 176 Moving further, it assessed the
AIDS/HIV epidemic in Africa to be “the bitter harvest of a global
discrimination,” in turn the result of “five centuries of racism, slavery
and impoverishing colonialism.” 177 A news story reporting the visit
indicated, “[a] heavily symbolic trip, Castro is traveling from a country
where most of its 11 million citizens have some African ancestry to the
continent where thousands of Cuban troops died helping free black
nations from white colonialism.” 178
Following the conference, Castro met with a group of about 440
Cuban medical personnel said to be providing healthcare services in
South Africa. 179 And before leaving South Africa, Castro met with
former South African leader Nelson Mandela, unable to attend the
173. Id. The United States and Israel boycotted the conference due to what they perceived
as “anti-Israel” for equating Zionism with racism in its agenda and for the United States
additionally because of the inclusion of reparation for slavery in that agenda. See Cuba Warns
of Globalization of Apartheid; US Delegation Walks Out and Fidel Castro Terms U.S.
Emancipation
of
Slaves
“Purely
Formal”),
AFROCUBAWEB,
http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm [https://perma.cc/RFF3-6EBR] (last visited Sept. 20,
2019).
174 . Castro, supra note 171. Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories that Cuba
assessed as genocide included forced evictions, occupation, blockade, and extrajudicial killings.
Cuba and the World Conference against Racism. See Cuba Calls for Slavery Reparations at
Conference
on
Racism,
AFROCUBAWEB,
http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm
[https://perma.cc/RFF3-6EBR] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
175. Castro, supra note 171.
176. Julio Cesar Mejias Cardena, The Cuban Statement on the Meeting on Racism in South
Africa, AFROCUBAWEB (Aug. 30, 2001), http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZE32-2XB6]. Granma is the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist
Party.
177. Id.
178. Snow, supra note 16.
179 . See Cuba Warns of Globalization of Apartheid; US Delegation Walks Out,
AFROCUBAWEB , http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm [https://perma.cc/RFF3-6EBR] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2019).
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conference due to ill-health, who reportedly stated: “What [Castro] did
for us is not easy to describe in words. During the struggle against
apartheid, Fidel did not hesitate in giving us help, and now that we are
free, we have many Cuban medical doctors working here, helping us in
rural areas, where there are practically no physicians.” 180 Given that, as
one commentator observed, Castro’s regime did “more for AfroCubans in 50 years than previous administrations [ . . . ] in the last 400
years[,]” 181 Castro’s campaign against racism and xenophobia also
paralleled and gave tonic to his achievements at home related to that
campaign.
D. Cuba under Fidel Castro as Global Good Samaritan from the
Socialist World
Global Good Samaritans is the name Professor Alison Brysk
coined for states and other political communities who consistently and
systematically apply human rights in their external relations. 182 In their
foreign relations, global Good Samaritans project a “kindness of
strangers” driven by the biblical injunction to “love your neighbor as
yourself.” 183 Six such states that Brysk surveyed in her seminal work,
each of which, to varying degrees, applied human rights in external
affairs, in alphabetical order, were Canada, Costa Rica, Japan, the
Netherlands, South Africa, and Sweden. The seventh was a set of
transnational human rights organizations, “coalitions of the caring,”
including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA). Whether coincidentally or deliberately, all of these
political communities were capitalist-oriented. The current author’s
study, focused on Nigeria, equally involved a capitalist country. 184
180 . See Cuba Warns of Globalization of Apartheid; US Delegation Walks Out and
Viewpoint: Globalized Solidarity Confronts Globalization of Apartheid), AFROCUBAWEB,
http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm [https://perma.cc/RFF3-6EBR] (last visited Sept. 20,
2019).
181. Jacobs, supra note 99.
182. See BRYSK, supra note 133.
183 . The appellation “kindness of strangers” is taken from the book’s frontispiece
consisting of a poem on “The Kindness of Strangers.” The appellation “love your neighbor”
goes to the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan from Luke 10:25-37 (New Int’l Version).
“Which of these three [a priest, a Levite, and a Samaritan] do you think was a neighbor to the
man who fell into the hands of robbers?” The expert in the law replied, “The one who had mercy
on him.” Jesus told him, “Go and do likewise.” Id. at 36-37.
184. See generally AKA, supra note 133.
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Given the extensiveness of its socioeconomic assistance
documented in this Article, Cuba under Castro deserves to be included
in the pantheon of global Good Samaritans. The academic literature
related to this topic has holes that Cuba as a socialist state can fill. The
critic might argue that Cuba promoted these rights as part of the
privileging of socioeconomic over political-civil rights by the socialist
world in its competition against “bourgeois capitalism” that hallmarked
the Cold War. 185 But, as we see in this Article, there was no
opportunism in the use of this tool: Cuba’s use of this tool predated the
high point of the Cold War and Havana exported abroad the same
“material and cultural goods that human beings need” that it dispensed
so well at home without discrimination to all groups, including AfroCubans, for whom, socioeconomically, Castro did more “in 50 years
than previous administrations [ . . . ] in the last 400 years.” 186
Commenting on Cuban military and socioeconomic assistance
from 1961 to 1965, Professor Gleijeses aptly observed that “[i]f Cuba’s
foreign policy were based solely on realpolitik, Cuba would have not
helped Algeria. Its assistance to Algeria reflects a level of idealism that
is unusual in the foreign affairs of great or small powers and that has
continued to be part of Cuban policy toward Africa through all these
years.” 187 Witness Castro recounting, in October of 1963, the story of
Havana’s aid to Algeria:
Men and weapons from our country crossed the Atlantic in record
time to fight side by side with the Algerian revolutionaries. [ . . . ]
Distance did not prevent us from being the first to arrive. [ . . . ]
We, a small country relentlessly threatened by the imperialists,
sent some of our best weapons to the Algerian people. 188

Somewhat parenthetically, this statement also speaks to Cuba’s
status as an independent actor, rather than as a Soviet proxy. This
occurrence is contrary to the contention of many US and other Western
analysts, much of which was shrouded in the propagandistic posturing
that marked the Cold War. In intervening in Africa, particularly
Angola, Castro’s Cuba acted independently without securing the
support of the Soviet authorities then engaged in détente with the
185. See, e.g., Richard N. Dean, Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in
International Law, 21 VA. J. INT’L L. 55, 57 (1980) (stating that “Soviet legal scholars view
economic and social rights as primary”).
186. See supra note 99.
187. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 191.
188. Id. at 190.
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United States. 189 It also acted in defiance of the United States with
whom before the intervention it sought to warm up relations. Worse
still, it did this at the risk of US invasion. Both at home and abroad,
Castro’s commitment to socioeconomic human rights was driven by
his personal “trust in the intelligence of peoples and men[,]” a trust
driven by the belief that “the greatest crises have always given rise to
the greatest solutions.” 190 Therefore, it is hard to gainsay the
observation that critics of Castro who complained about his one-party
rule and repressive policies, including his intervention in Africa, never
said he was “on the wrong side of history” or that he “sponsored
dictatorships in [ . . . ] developing countries.” 191
Complementing Cuba’s socioeconomic human rights efforts,
Cuban military assistance in Africa during the period under review was
arguably “human rights as foreign policy” in action. 192 Recall Castro’s
farewell address to delegates at the Seventh Congress of the
Communist Party of Cuba, specifically his observation that with hard
work and dedication, Cuban communists “can produce the material and
cultural goods that human beings need.” 193 His overall action over his
period in office suggests that the “human beings” he had in mind
included people in Cuba and elsewhere in the world, including
Africans. Like in everything else, global Good Samaritans need not be
perfect so long as they robustly interject human rights in their
principled foreign policy, 194 something Cuba under Castro did.
Therefore, this Article’s evaluation of Castro as global Good Samaritan
by no means dismisses the human rights abuses, particularly in the
realm of political civil-rights, that took place under his watch. 195
189. See Conflicting Missions, supra note 90 (stating that Cuba made the decision to send
troops without informing the Soviet Union and deployed them without Soviet assistance for the
first two months).
190. Castro, supra note 98, at 5.
191. Jacobs, supra note 119.
192. BRYSK, supra note 133.
193. See Carroll, supra note 2.
194. AKA, supra note 133, at 256 (focusing on Nigeria).
195. See Human Rights Watch, Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Record of Repression, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castrosrecord-repression [https://perma.cc/9LA5-UMRY] (pointing out that under Castro, “[t]he
progress on economic, social, and cultural rights was never matched in terms of respect for civil
and political rights”). This press release quoted José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at
Human Rights Watch to the effect that “[a]s other countries in the region turned away from
authoritarian rule, only Fidel Castro’s Cuba continued to repress virtually all civil and political
rights.” Id. It regretfully observed that “[m]any of the abusive tactics developed during his time
in power,” such as “surveillance, beatings, arbitrary detention, and public acts of repudiation,”
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Events in the United States since January of 2017 when President
Donald J. Trump took office teach the lesson that even countries
usually regarded as paragons of democracy and human rights may at
times backslide and tread in an unprogressive direction. 196
With Castro’s death in 2016 and the end of his era, discussing his
regime’s qualification as global Good Samaritan is necessary for the
dispassionate reassessment of his legacy. It has been argued elsewhere,
using Nigeria in its Fourth Republic since 1999 as an example, that
charity begins at home, and that countries that do not integrate human
rights in their external affairs will have no human rights peace at
home. 197 Specifically, states who deny their citizens socioeconomic
benefits at home will not treat “strangers” abroad well. 198 Castro’s
Cuba illustrates this point. The country prioritized education,
healthcare, housing and other welfare goods that it had no difficulty
pursuing abroad with passion even with economic constraints at
home.199 Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy by other
means. As Dwight Eisenhower advised and Castro exemplified, it is
foolhardy to undermine at home the very values a state seeks to realize
abroad through the design and implementation of its external
policies. 200
Given its population of less than twelve million people and its
modest natural resource base, Cuba under Castro consistently cast a
“are still used by the Cuban government.” Id. Rather than all or nothing, we prefer a balanced
approach of the type exemplified, coincidentally again by Amnesty International, which
acknowledged Castro’s impressive gains in socioeconomic human rights at home while pointing
up the “dark[] legacy” evident in “a ruthless suppression of freedom of expression” that marked
his rule. See supra notes 13-15. The press release quoted above in this footnote also reflects the
same balanced approach.
196. See, e.g., Nick Bryant, How Will History Judge President Trump, BBC (Jan. 17,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46895634 [https://perma.cc/YY7A-YGJS]
(pointing out that no US leader “has so flagrantly flouted the normal rules of presidential
behavior” the way President Trump has done). As opposed to the idiosyncratic coloration of
U.S. chief executives, what sets America apart from many countries is that, as this author
observed elsewhere, it is a nation constantly “in search of itself in an ongoing attempt to realize
its founding principles” embedded abstractly in equal rights. AKA, supra note 133, at 258.
197. AKA, supra note 133, at 123-63.
198. Id. (“Political communities who visit ill on ‘strangers’ abroad will have no difficulty
finding maleficent strangers at home”).
199. See Aurelio Alonso, Cuba: Society after Half a Century of Changes, Achievements
and Setbacks, 25 ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 7 (2011) (painting a mixed picture of progress that
included “improvement in meeting the basic needs of Cuban society,” evident in improved
nutrition, negligible unemployment, increase in the retail market for consumer goods, as well as
an increment in the production of doctors and nurses).
200. See supra notes 143-45.
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large shadow over the international stage in many areas, including
socioeconomic human rights. 201 As John Kirk and Michael Erisman
observed in their work instructively titled Cuban Medical
Internationalism, despite its small size, Cuba has saved more lives in
the developing world than all of the G-8 countries joined together.202
Under Castro, in exemplary demonstration of “human rights as foreign
policy” in action, Cuba provided medical services to the developing
world that tracked the public health that it reserved for its citizens at
home. 203
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the level of poverty in Africa, 204 there is imperative need
for socioeconomic human rights to complement political-civil rights.
No single statesman outside Africa promoted these rights more than
Castro. Both in Cuba and abroad, in Africa, Castro fought tirelessly to
provide access to socioeconomic goods. The scale and consistency of
these contributions for a small country with an economy contained by
US embargo make Cuba under Castro a global Good Samaritan within
the context of principled application of human rights in external affairs.
As Nelson Mandela observed during his visit to Cuba in 1991, “[w]hat
other country can point to a record of greater selflessness than Cuba
has displayed in its relations to Africa?” 205
This Article seeks to promote proper understanding of Cuba’s
military assistance programs in Africa, especially during the period of
1975 to 1991. Its position is that these programs may be profitably
viewed from multiple levels, additional to the factor of service to
international communism that dominates the academic literature. There
are two shifts in the literature, hopefully this Article initiates, that need
201 . See John M. Kirk et al., Cuba’s Cold War Medical Aid Programs, in KIRK &
ERISMAN, supra note 75, at 59.
202. KIRK & ERISMAN, supra note 75 (abstract on the book’s back cover). Formed in 1975
in Denver, Colorado in the United States, the G-8 countries refer to the association of eight
highly-industrialized states in the world—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—who meet annually to foster consensus and harmonize
policies on a range of global issues, including economic growth, energy, and terrorism. The
group was reconfigured to G-7 after Russia was suspended in 2014 because of its intervention
in the Ukraine. See Zachary Laub, The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-eight-g8industrialized-nations [https://perma.cc/A8E3-2DCR].
203. KIRK & ERISMAN, supra note 75 (abstract).
204. See supra notes 169-70 and corresponding texts.
205. Gleijeses, supra note 51.
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to take place. The first is disaggregation of socioeconomic goods from
the general category of Cuban military assistance. The second is a
movement away from the overemphasis on capitalist countries when it
comes to countries who consistently apply human rights in their
external affairs. For balance, these studies must now include socialist
states.
Two interesting questions outside the scope of this Article must
be kept in mind for future studies: first, given the indivisibility of civilpolitical and socioeconomic rights, to what extent has the socialist
world now embraced political-civil rights rather than see it as part of
the baggage of “bourgeois capitalism”? Second, related to this first
question, to what extent, if any, does Cuba still provide access to
socioeconomic human rights in Africa, given that post-Castro Cuba
remains socialist? Regarding the second question, two intertwined
trends are discernible that bear recounting here: medical
internationalism, and “human rights as foreign policy” in action. 206
Castro’s successors continue to provide socioeconomic
assistance, in the form of medical missions, to Africa. 207 Testament to
this proposition is a tropical cyclone, Hurricane Idai, that, in March
2019, hit several countries in southern Africa but left the lion’s share
of its destructive effect from high winds, rains, and flooding, on
Mozambique. 208 The cyclone wreaked extensive damage on the
country, including the death of about 500 people. 209 The Cuban
206. See generally BRYSK, supra note 133; KIRK & ERISMAN, supra note 75.
207. See, e.g., Rich Warner, Why Cuban Doctors in Kenya Don’t Deserve the Treatment
They’re Getting, THE CONVERSATION (June 27, 2019), https://theconversation.com/why-cubandoctors-in-kenya-dont-deserve-the-treatment-theyre-getting-98774
[https://perma.cc/N66QDL9Q] (observing that nearly 132,000 “Cuban doctors have taken part in international [medical]
missions” in 107 countries across the world, the latest, post-Castro, being Kenya). The treatment
the commentator indicated the Cuban physicians did not deserve was the opposition to their
arrival by Kenyan health personnel on the ground that the Cubans will take away local jobs, a
contention the commentator disputed with facts he marshalled in his commentary. See id.
208. See, e.g., Cuban Doctors Praised for Their Work in Post-Cyclone Mozambique,
ORINOCO TRIBUNE (June 3, 2019), https://orinocotribune.com/cuban-doctors-praised-fortheir-work-in-post-cyclone-mozambique [https://perma.cc/2WJJ-RGZZ]; Cuban Doctors Have
Treated Thousands of Mozambique Hurricane Victims, PERIÓDICO26.CU (Apr. 16, 2019);
Radio Havana Cuba, Cuba to Help Mozambique Idai Victims with Field Hospital,
ESCAMBRAY (Mar. 27, 2019), http://en.escambray.cu/2019/cuba-to-help-mozambique-idaivictims-with-field-hospital/ [https://perma.cc/677C-4C6E]; Cyclone Idai in Malawi,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, OXFAM INT’L,
https://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/cyclone-idai-malawi-mozambique-and-zimbabwe
[https://perma.cc/BEA6-SQ5X].
209. Cuban Doctors Have Treated Thousands of Mozambique Hurricane Victims, supra
note 208.
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government responded in humanitarian assistance with a field hospital
installed in Beira (population: nearly 600,000 residents), one of
Mozambique’s largest city and one of the cities most affected by the
natural disaster. 210 The field hospital consisted of 20 hospital beds with
consultations, an operating room, a clinical and microbiological
laboratory, and imaging equipment. 211 The contingent of Cuban
medical personnel, numbering sixteen doctors, twenty-two specialists
and two service workers, who joined more than 300 already on the
ground, 212 spent 63 days in the country during which period they
provided medical care to over 22,000 patients and performed over three
hundred surgeries on adults and children. 213 In announcing the dispatch
of the field hospital to Mozambique, Cuban President Miguel DiazCanel twitted “[f]rom Cuba, we sent personnel, equipment and
medicines to strengthen health care [in Mozambique], assuming our
solidarity and internationalist vocation.” 214 Cuban Minister of Public
Health Jose Angel Portal spoke no less effusively when he observed
that the medical personnel “wrote a new page of solidarity for Cuban
public health, and they are part of that history that shows the world
what we are capable of doing.” 215

210. Supra note 208.
211. Cuban Doctors Have Treated Thousands of Mozambique Hurricane Victims, supra
note 208; Radio Havana Cuba, Cuba to Help Mozambique Idai Victims with Field Hospital,
supra note 208.
212. Cuban Doctors Have Treated Thousands of Mozambique Hurricane Victims, supra
note 208.
213. Cuban Doctors Praised for Their Work in Post-Cyclone Mozambique, supra note 208
214. Cuban Doctors Have Treated Thousands of Mozambique Hurricane Victims, supra
note 208.
215. Cuban Doctors Praised for Their Work in Post-Cyclone Mozambique, supra note 208.

